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 Executive Summary 
During the latter half of the 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, budget 
constraints were increasingly tight, resulting in Defense budget reductions (measured in 
constant dollars) that commenced in FY 1986 and extended through FY 1997—the only 
increase being FY 1991, corresponding to Operation Desert Storm. In an attempt to 
squeeze every penny from required resources, DoD leadership emphasized the 
necessity of controlling cost of new warfighting systems—not only the cost of 
development and production, but also the cost of sustainment.  In 1995, Dr. Paul 
Kaminski, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), 
introduced the term “Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)” in recognition that 
resources were tight and that weapon system costs—lifecycle costs—would have to be 
managed and controlled through tradeoffs that occur during the developmental process. 
As one who is familiar with policy change in the DoD might expect, decisive 
change did not result immediately.  Nevertheless, a group of Pilot programs were 
identified within each DoD Component that would provide lessons for Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC).   
Furthermore, a relevant series of OSD and CJCS regulatory changes were 
published in 2003 and 2004 which were intended to support CAIV and contribute to R-
TOC. It now seems time to gauge emerging changes. This research effort proceeds by 
seeking answers to the following questions.   
• Has the DoD put into place policy and implemented guidance to support the 
practice CAIV in the acquisition of the DoD’s warfighting systems? 
• Has the DoD established the necessary processes and tools to monitor and 
control CAIV? 
• Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership 
Costs (TOC) of its warfighting systems? 
=
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 • In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total Ownership 
Cost somehow changed? 
Using data available from a variety of DoD sources and interviews with expert 
DoD personnel, this paper highlights changes in policy, process, and practice aimed at 
reducing system lifecycle cost.  The paper will point out new or remaining obstacles to 
the application of Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) and Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC). The focus of this paper is the “front end” of the process—that 
is: during Concept Refinement, Technology Development, associated Joint 
Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews, and acquisition Milestones A & B.  
A. Has the DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance, to 
practice CAIV in the acquisition of DoD’s warfighting systems? 
The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD 
(AT&L)) published new acquisition policy and guidance, beginning on 12 May 2003 with 
DoD 5000.1, The Defense Acquisition System, and DoDI 5000.2, Operating the 
Defense Acquisition System.  The companion Defense Acquisition Guidebook, 
containing discretionary best practices, was placed online in the fall of 2004.   
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published two directives in June 2003—
on capability development: CJCSI 3170.01C Instruction, Joint Capabilities Integration 
and Development System (JCIDS) and the accompanying CJCSM 3170.01 Manual, 
Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System.  The 
instruction and manual were updated on 12 March 2004, with publication of CJCSI 
3170.01D and CJCSM 3170.01A. 
In combination, these directives, together with the online Guidebook, address the 
requirement for affordability assessments (in terms of modernization funding, i.e., 
RDT&E and procurement, and manpower) and consideration of total ownership cost 
(TOC) or system lifecycle cost (LCC) during Concept Refinement, Technology 
Development.  Lifecycle cost is related to such activities as preparing the Initial 
Capabilities Document (ICD); conducting the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA); writing the 
Capability Development Document (CDD); and progressing through JCIDS/JROC 
=
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 reviews, the Concept Decision, and Milestones A & B.  Collectively, these regulations 
influence the work of sponsors, users, developers, staff overseers, leaders, and 
decision-makers. 
Although there are numerous references and requirements focused on cost, 
neither the DoD 5000 series nor the CJSC 3170 series require that lifecycle cost targets 
or lifecycle cost key performance parameters must be established for newly emerging 
systems. 
B. Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control 
CAIV? 
The R-TOC Pilots—The R-TOC Pilot programs have yielded numerous processes 
that are useful to control lifecycle cost.  Many lessons have been reported from this effort, 
which began in October 1999.  Additionally, the need for improved cost databases and 
cost estimating tools has resulted in initiatives in each of the DoD Components and with 
defense contractors.  Unfortunately, the R-TOC pilots currently do not include any 
programs that are early in their developmental cycle: that is, prior to Milestone B.  There 
are obvious, prominent choices that could be selected as CAIV pilot programs in each 
of the DoD Components that might yield valuable lessons-learned for the acquisition 
community.  Without designated CAIV pilot programs, the DoD may fail to capture these 
important lessons. This could leave unresolved whether or not current directives and 
processes are sufficient to guide the pre-acquisition and early development of new 
warfighting systems. 
C. Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership 
Costs of its warfighting systems? 
In general, there is considerable pressure on programs to prepare early cost information.  In some instances, the 
pressure has been intensified through the use of Key Performance Parameters (KPP) written by the sponsors or users into 
requirements (ORD) or capability documents (CDD).  Additionally, there is indication of at least one program specifying 
early cost targets in its acquisition strategy document. 
JROC emphasis on TOC—The JROC has the latitude to question cost or 
affordability, but the role of the JROC is reportedly more focused on other issues (such 
as interoperability and joint use) than on cost.  The JROC’s lack of emphasis on 
=
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 affordability seems to be an opportunity lost; users might be more strongly encouraged 
to take an active interest in setting ownership cost targets.   
Milestone Decision Authority emphasis on Cost—For various reasons, 
acquisition milestone decision points may offer a better opportunity than the JROC 
process to address and influence warfighting system lifecycle cost.  Much of the 
pressure on cost comes from mandatory independent cost estimates (ICE) that precede 
milestone reviews. 
DoD Component leaders (within and outside acquisition) seem reluctant to 
demand lifecycle cost targets prior to system development, possibly out of concern that 
incorrectly specified cost targets could increase program risk from “outside.”  No doubt, 
such an error in estimated cost could result in unfavorable attention to a critically 
needed warfighting system, and might even lead to its termination. 
DoD Component leaders also may lack confidence in lifecycle cost estimates 
until systems have been sufficiently tested and are poised for production and fielding.  
There is a balance that needs careful handling.  The earlier developers can set realistic 
cost targets, the better the cost control—earlier is better.  On the other hand, poorly 
chosen cost targets might provide a program obstacle that delays or even topples the 
program.   
D. In the meantime, has the focus on CAIV and Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost somehow changed?  
Sec. 811. Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies—This 
law provides relief from applicable law and regulation in acquiring critical materiel where 
combat fatalities have occurred.  In a wartime environment, when US Armed Forces 
personnel are operating in harm’s way, TOC necessarily should become secondary to 
safety and survivability.  An obvious example, up-armoring HMMWVs and other trucks 
in Iraq, illustrates the point.  A likely outcome of up-armoring vehicles, albeit one that 
seems to attract little notice, is the significant wear and tear on other vehicle 
components, which will directly result in increased system lifecycle cost. 
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 Other Changes in Focus—Two other major acquisition initiatives may increase 
pressure on TOC and possibly compete against CAIV during the “front-end” analysis of 
an emerging warfighting system.  The first is spiral development, which almost 
assuredly adds to logistics burden (that is, O&S cost).  The other is the possibility of 
errors in analysis during the Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) determination—
resulting in outsourced logistics that are virtually locked-in, but which, in certain 
scenarios, may become more expensive than alternative approaches.  Both spiral 
development and PBL have potential effects on TOC that need further study. 
Fact-of-Life Growth in Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS)—
Although this may not be a change in focus, essential change has gradually shaded the 
picture of system lifecycle cost.  That is, the miracles wrought by software do not come 
without an increase in logistics cost.  PDSS costs are expensive and must be 
anticipated in system lifecycle cost estimates.       
=
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 I. Background 
During the latter half of the 1980s and throughout much of the 1990s, budget 
constraints were increasingly tight, resulting in Defense budget reductions (measured in 
constant dollars) that commenced in FY 1986 and extended through FY 1997—the only 
increase being FY 1991, corresponding to Operation Desert Storm.1  In an attempt to 
squeeze every penny from required resources, DoD leaders emphasized the necessity 
of controlling cost of new warfighting systems—not only the cost of development and 
production, but also the cost of sustainment.  In 1995, Dr. Paul Kaminski, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD (A&T)), introduced the term 
“Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV)” in recognition that resources were tight and 
that weapon system costs—lifecycle costs—would have to be managed and controlled 
through tradeoffs that occur during the developmental process.2
Over several years, the United States General Accounting Office (now renamed 
the Government Accountability Office (GAO)) reported private sector best practices for 
controlling costs and pointedly compared DoD acquisitions against private-sector best 
practices.  In response to GAO suggestions for improvement, the DoD said the 
improvements would be forthcoming with the publication of new policy guidance.  The 
new policy directives were published, beginning in May 2003.  The final piece—the 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook that recommends process and practice—was placed 
online in the fall of 2004.  Now it is possible to address the operative question: Has the 
DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance to practice CAIV during the 
development and acquisition of the DoD’s warfighting systems?  Likewise, has the DoD 
established the necessary processes and tools to monitor and control CAIV?  
Additionally, has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership 
                                            
1 Congressional Budget Office, Long Term Implications of Current Defense Plans: Detailed Update for FY 
2005, September 2004, Figure 1-1, 2.  
2 Paul Kaminski, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Untitled Memorandum to the Secretaries of the 
Military Departments, et al., 4 December 1995. 
=
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 Costs or lifecycle costs of its warfighting systems?  In the meantime, has the focus on 
CAIV and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost somehow changed? 
Using data available from a variety of DoD sources and interviews with expert 
DoD personnel, this paper highlights changes in policy, process, and practice aimed at 
reducing system lifecycle cost.  The paper will point out new or remaining obstacles to 
the application of Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) and Reduction in Total 
Ownership Cost (R-TOC).  
The focus of this paper is the “front end” of the lifecycle process.  As defined by 
the researcher, “front end” refers to Concept Refinement, Technology Development, 
associated Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) reviews, and acquisition 
Milestones A & B.  The importance of the “front end” (that is, those activities that occur 
prior to Milestone B) may be easily understood from the notional diagram at Figure 1, 
below.  Activities such as the Analysis of Alternatives, selection of the Preferred System 
Concept, writing of the Capability Development Document, and conducting technology 
demonstrations all occur at the “front end,” prior to Milestone B; collectively, these 
activities set the course for system development and effectively lock in a high 
percentage of the lifecycle cost of the future warfighting system.  Milestone B is the 
point at which the decision authority approves entry into System Development & 
Demonstration; this signals the beginning of the detailed design effort. 
=
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Figure 1. Percent of LCC Locked in by the Design Decisions3
II. Scope 
The scope of this research effort is, first, to review OSD directives, identify 
specific CAIV guidance, and weigh whether that guidance is up to the task of 
implementing CAIV in the development of warfighting systems. 
Second, this research will include interviews of knowledgeable personnel who 
might offer insights into programs that have recently completed their Milestone B 
Decision Points. It is worth examining whether leadership pressure is being brought to 
bear in reducing ownership cost around this point of development, because the period 
when warfighting systems are in pre-acquisition, progressing through various reviews, 
and in early System Development is recognized as providing a unique opportunity to 
affect system lifecycle cost. 
=
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 Third, this research will examine whether existing cost databases and estimating 
tools contribute to setting realistic CAIV goals and, then, tracking performance in pursuit 
of those goals. 
Definitions 
Definitions of Total Ownership Cost (TOC), Cost as an Independent Variable 
(CAIV), and Reduction in Total Ownership Cost (R-TOC) provide a foundation on which 
to have a discussion of the “front-end” processes that are used to control the lifecycle 
cost of warfighting systems. 
TOC: The following definition of TOC is deliberately written from the vantage 
point of the program manager of the warfighting system: 
Defense Systems TOC is defined as Lifecycle Cost (LCC). LCC (per DoD 
5000.4M) includes not only acquisition program direct costs, but also the indirect 
costs attributable to the acquisition program (i.e., costs that would not occur if the 
program did not exist). For example, indirect costs would include the 
infrastructure that plans, manages, and executes a program over its full life and 
common support items and systems.  The responsibility of program managers in 
support of reducing DoD TOC is the continuous reduction of LCC for their 
systems.4
CAIV: Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) addresses Total Ownership Cost 
during the warfighting system’s pre-acquisition and developmental phases, beginning 
with Concept Refinement.  The focus of CAIV is to establish cost targets based on 
affordability and required capabilities and then to manage to those targets, thereby 
controlling TOC.  CAIV includes consideration of costs for development, production, 
operations and support, and disposal.  An example of the CAIV process would be to set 
specific cost and reliability targets for each subsystem or component of a weapon 
                                                                                                                                             
3 Modified from schematic use in Naval Postgraduate School course MN3331, Principles of Acquisition 
and Program Management. 
4 Jacques S. Gansler, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum: Definition of Total Ownership 
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 system in development, such that the warfighting system would be able to achieve its 
required operational availability (AO) at the specified cost. 
R-TOC: The second approach to TOC is the Reduction in Total Ownership Cost 
(R-TOC). This focuses on the reduction of average procurement unit cost (APUC) and 
weapon-system sustainment cost—that is, operating & support (O&S) costs.  R-TOC is 
employed as the warfighting system is produced and placed in service.  Examples of R-
TOC would be a value engineering change proposal (VECP) to reduce the cost of 
manufacturing a component by improving the process yield (the percentage the 
manufactured items that are defect-free) or a VECP to reduce the operating and support 
cost by improving the reliability of an expensive subsystem or component.  Often, there 
are secondary benefits of enhanced performance (e.g., improved operational 
availability), but the forcing function is the reduction of operating and support costs—the 
largest constituent of TOC. 
This paper will focus on the “front end” of TOC, and will address CAIV primarily.  
CAIV should begin to take shape during pre-acquisition—that is, during the Concept 
Refinement and Technology Development phases, when the user and/or sponsor are 
shaping the direction of the future program.  During this period, much attention is aimed 
at stating required capabilities, which the eventual warfighting system must deliver.  
Decisions made during the pre-acquisition phases will determine much of the eventual 
system costs, including operating and support costs, most of which will not actually be 
incurred until years later. 
Affordability: Affordability is system Total Ownership Cost (or, system lifecycle 
cost) against a backdrop of available resources.  A current DoD definition is “the degree 
to which the lifecycle cost of an acquisition program is in consonance with the long-
range modernization, force structure, and manpower plans of the individual DoD 
Components, as well as for the Department as a whole.”5   
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 III. Methodology 
Literature Research  
This technical paper includes literature research.  Data collected through a 
literature review is arranged and analyzed.  
OSD and CJCS Regulatory Guidance.  There is a body of mandatory and 
discretionary guidance published by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and by the DoD Components. Much of this material is on the 
AT&L Knowledge Sharing System website maintained by the Defense Acquisition 
University (DAU) for the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics), USD (AT&L).6 The site provides current web-based materials on TOC and 
CAIV. 
Published Materials: Books, Journals, Periodicals, Government Documents, 
Reports, Best Practices, Theses, Studies, Speeches, and Briefs.  Much has been 
written on the subjects of lifecycle cost (LCC), total ownership cost, cost as an 
independent variable (CAIV), reduction in total ownership cost (R-TOC), average 
procurement unit costs (APUC), and operating and support costs (O&S). There are 
numerous reports on Flagship Programs and Pilot Programs that are, or were, 
experimenting in cost-reduction methodologies.  Students at the Naval Postgraduate 
School have accomplished considerable research and published numerous Master’s 
theses related to management of total ownership cost. The Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) (previously the General Accounting Office) has published significant work 
comparing the DoD system acquisition to commercial best practices.  
The Defense Acquisition University has developed educational materials on Total 
Ownership Cost (TOC) and Cost As an Independent Variable (CAIV) best practices and 
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 has placed significant materials online.  The Total Ownership Cost “Special Interest 
Area (SIA)” site may be reached from the “AT&L Knowledge Sharing System” website.  
In addition to the DAU websites, the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) 
maintains an informative website, “Reduction of Total Ownership Costs,” that comprises 
a collection of the lessons-learned and best practices garnered from the R-TOC Pilot 
programs.7  
Expert Interviews 
Published guidance and useable tools may be found to a large extent, as 
described above.  The third question, however, relates to the will and determination of 
the DoD leadership in applying and emphasizing CAIV and other up-front efforts to 
reduce lifecycle cost; therefore, it requires discussion with practitioners and others who 
are positioned to see the acquisition process in action.  This requires interviews, the 
scope of which will not catalyze a high degree of statistical confidence, but will provide a 
sense of the direction of DoD leadership on matters of lifecycle cost. 
                                            
7 see http://rtoc.ida.org/rtoc/rtoc.html. 
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 IV. Data and Analysis 
Data and analysis are arranged in the order that the questions were posed in the 
Section I, Background, above. 
A. Has the DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance to 
practice CAIV in the acquisition of the DoD’s warfighting systems? 
Published Policy and Guidance 
New policy on acquisition was published on 12 May 2003: DoD 5000.1, The 
Defense Acquisition System and DoDI 5000.2, Operating the Defense Acquisition 
System.    
A month later, in June 2003, capability development was described in CJCSI 
3170.01C Instruction, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) 
and the accompanying CJCSM 3170.01 Manual, Operation of the Joint Capabilities 
Integration and Development System.  The instruction and manual were updated on 12 
March 2004, with publication of CJCSI 3170.01D and CJCSM 3170.01A.   
During the fall of 2004, the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (DAG) was put 
online; the Guidebook recommends processes and practices that support both the DoD 
5000 series and the CJCS 3170 series directives.  Together, these recent OSD and 
CJCS documents and the online Guidebook’s best practices provide policy and process 
guidance for preparation of user-required capabilities (CJCS 3170 series), along with 
acquisition policy and practice (DoD 5000 series).   
DoD 5000 series direction related to ownership cost is prominent in DoDI 5000.2.  
Addressing pre-acquisition activity, this document directs that multiple approaches be 
examined with robust analysis that considers affordability along with technology maturity 
and responsiveness.8  In a later paragraph, it mandates that the user and developer 
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 must agree that the solution is affordable.9  This document establishes that an 
affordable increment of militarily useful capability must be identified as a condition for 
exiting the Technology Development phase.10  Finally, it stipulates that cost be 
addressed in the Capability Development Document, using lifecycle cost or TOC, if 
available.11  Mandatory program documentation includes an Affordability Assessment at 
both Milestone B and Milestone C.12
The various references to cost and affordability do not require that lifecycle cost 
targets be established during pre-acquisition.  It would seem prudent to amend DoD 
5000.2 to require establishment of LCC targets at the system level and encourage 
establishment of LCC targets down to sub-system and component levels. 
Affordability Assessment—Affordability was defined in the Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook as “the degree to which the Lifecycle cost of an acquisition program is in 
consonance with the long-range modernization, force structure, and manpower plans of 
the individual DoD Components, as well as for the Department as a whole.”13  This 
guidance seems a relevant and useful approach, starting from the perspective of the 
funding for a warfighting system within its particular mission area and expanding 
outward to show the programmatic effects in concentric rings—first, comparing a 
program’s modernization cost and manpower with other programs in the specific 
mission area; then, comparing competing mission areas; and, finally, illustrating the 
modernization and manpower impact at the DoD Component level—such that the 
Milestone Decision Authority can see where the system modernization funding and 
manpower must come from and can verify that the system is fully-funded over a time 
horizon that stretches out about 20 years.  The three sample charts on affordability in 
the Defense Acquisition Guidebook are extracted and shown below.  As informative as 
                                            
9 Ibid., paragraph 3.6.5, 6. 
10 Ibid., paragraph 3.6.7, 6. 
11 Ibid., paragraph 3.7.2.6, 8. 
12 Ibid., Enclosure 3, 21. 
13 DoD, DAG, part 3.2. 
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 this approach is, the depictions in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook focus very 
pointedly on modernization funding and manpower requirements;14 the Guidebook 
approach does not include other O&S costs (beyond the manpower portion).  
Affordability assessment (as described in the Guidebook) fails to show the increasing 
effects of the operating and support portion of lifecycle cost; these increases occur 
particularly as sustainment costs build up due to the increasing quantities of warfighting 
systems entering service and as the fielded systems age and begin to require more 
costly support.    
 
 
Figure 3.2.2.1.  Sample Chart of Funding Streams by Program15
                                            




- 11 - 
  
 
Figure 3.2.2.2. Sample Chart of Funding Streams by Mission Area16
                                            
16  Ibid. 
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Figure 3.2.2.3. Sample Annual Modernization Funding17
The follow-on section of the Guidebook addresses the longstanding DoD policy 
of full funding of acquisition programs.  Further, it defines full funding as including the 
dollars and manpower needed for all current and future efforts to carry out acquisition 
and support strategies.18  In support of full funding, amendment to the Guidebook 
section on affordability assessment would be prudent in order to depict the estimated 
full lifecycle cost of the warfighting system, including the O&S portion.  Affordability 
assessment could be made into a useful tool for understanding full funding, if expanded 
to address the complete lifecycle cost, instead of being limited to modernization funding 
and manpower.   
                                            
17 Ibid. 
18 DoD, DAG, part 3.2.3 
=
=
- 13 - 
 Capability Development Document—User and/or Sponsor decisions are part of 
the JCIDS process addressed in the CJCS 3170 series directives; User/sponsor 
decisions are described in several user-prepared documents, among them being the 
Capability Development Document (CDD).  The CDD articulates the required 
capabilities at such time as the developmental effort is turned over to the acquisition 
community to be executed.  A small number of the required capabilities described in the 
CDD may be designated by users/sponsors as Key Performance Parameters, KPP. 
KPP are those minimum attributes or characteristics considered most essential 
for an effective military capability; KPP are included verbatim in the Acquisition Program 
Baseline.19  KPP are of such importance that: “failure to meet a CDD KPP threshold can 
be cause for reevaluation of the system selection, reassessment or termination of the 
program.”20
Key Performance Parameters (KPP) Describing Cost—CJCSM 3170.01M, 
Operation of JCIDS, considers total ownership cost or lifecycle cost (including O&S, 
which is the sustainment portion of TOC and LCC) as a possible KPP in the following 
discussion of affordability:  
15. Program Affordability. The affordability determination is made as part 
of the cost assessment in the JCIDS analysis. Cost will be included in the 
CDD [Capability Development Document] as lifecycle cost or, if available, 
total ownership cost. The cost will include all associated system(s) 
DOTMLPF∗ costs. Inclusion of cost allows the sponsor to emphasize 
affordability in the proposed program. In addition, the discussion on 
affordability should articulate the CDD sponsor funding level estimates for 
developing, producing, and sustaining the desired capability. The cost 
figure should be stated in terms of a threshold and objective capability 
(not necessarily a KPP) to provide flexibility for program evolution and 
cost as an independent variable (CAIV) tradeoff studies. If cost is 
                                            
19 CJCS Instruction, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 12 March 2004, CJSCI 
3170.01D, GL-9. 
20 CJCS Manual, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 12 March 
2004, CJCSM 3170.01A, E-5. 
∗ DOTMLPF acronym refers to doctrine, organization, training and education, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities. See acronym list. 
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 identified as a KPP, include it in the KPP summary table. Cite applicable 
cost analyses conducted to date.21 [emphasis added] 
The above wording in CJCSM 3170.01A certainly does not appear to encourage the 
designation of cost as a KPP, but leaves open the possibility.   
Corresponding Navy Guidance.  The Navy’s companion instruction, 
SECNAVINST 5000.2C, provides direction that is slightly different from JCIDS language 
on cost as a KPP.  Corresponding Navy guidance on KPP is depicted in the following 
passage:  
Supportability and manpower may be key performance parameters (KPPs) for 
selected systems. For Navy programs the determination will be jointly made by 
the program sponsor and the Fleet Readiness and Logistics Sponsor (CNO (N4)) 
or the Manpower Sponsor (CNO (N1)), respectively. Program sponsors should 
assume a default consideration for supportability and manpower KPPs unless 
they obtain prior agreement with the CNO (N4) or CNO (N1) Sponsors.22
It is heartening that supportability and manpower assume default consideration as KPP, 
as both of these aspects directly and significantly contribute to lifecycle cost. 
B. Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and control 
CAIV? 
The R-TOC Pilots—Each DoD Component—Army, Navy (including the Marine 
Corps), and the Air Force—identified ten R-TOC Pilots in 1999 and have updated them 
when necessary, since that time.  However, the current list of R-TOC pilots does not 
include any programs early in their developmental cycle (i.e., prior to Milestone B).     
                                            
21 CJCS Manual, Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 12 March 
2004, CJCSM 3170.01A, Appendix A, 6, to Enclosure E.  
22 SECNAVINST, Implementation and Operation of the Defense Acquisition System and The Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System.  November 19, 2004. SECNAVINST 5000.2C, 
Enclosure (Chapter) 2, 6. 
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 There are obvious, prominent choices that could be selected as CAIV pilot 
programs in each of the DoD Components that might yield valuable lessons-learned for 
the acquisition community.  However, for unknown reasons, none has been designated; 
this absence is quite troubling, because it is well understood across the DoD (and, 
indeed, outside the DoD) that early design decisions are likely to have the greatest 
potential influence on lifecycle cost. 23  There may be justifiable rationale for not selecting 
any of the current systems in pre-acquisition to be an R-TOC pilot; however, without 
including R-TOC pilots that are at or approaching their Milestone B decision point, the 
community of users and developers may miss valuable learning opportunities pertinent 
to the critical period when decisions are made that could potentially have the greatest 
effect on TOC.  This is both a leadership and a learning issue.  It is a leadership issue if 
programs are not aggressively pursuing cost reduction during pre-acquisition; it is a 
learning issue if the DoD is not documenting different approaches for setting and 
refining lifecycle cost targets and managing in accordance with those targets. 
Specific demands for TOC Goals or Targets by the DoD Components—Interviews 
at the program office and oversight levels indicate that analogous lifecycle cost 
estimates are being constructed during pre-acquisition, but interviews did not yield any 
examples of LCC goals or targets at the subsystem or component level during pre-
acquisition, prior to milestone B.  Observance of cost targets would reflect a clear CAIV 
bias.  Lack of cost targets at the subsystem or component level may suggest a 
breakdown in cost control.  This could be due to different reasons, such as insufficient 
cost data, a lack of confidence in cost databases, or lack of commitment to control 
costs.   
Need for Clear, Accurate, Scrubbed Cost Data—One of the ways that analysts 
estimate the costs of a new warfighting system is to begin with the costs of earlier 
systems of a similar nature: that is, analogous systems.  The “cleaner” the cost 
database of the predecessor system(s), the higher the confidence in cost estimates for 
                                            
23 Benjamin S. Blanchard, Logistics Engineering and Management, 5th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1998), 493. 
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 the new system.  However, there are many problems associated with collection of cost 
data.  Cost databases are pulled together from many different sources.  For example, in 
the Army’s OSMIS database, fuel costs are pulled from one database and repair parts 
from another.  OSMIS merges or draws from multiple databases.  OSMIS peacetime 
information also is kept separate from wartime or contingency information.   
In an effort to obtain clean, reliable field-usage data, the Army has used Sample 
Data Collection (SDC) in special circumstances such as the fielding of a new system.  
SDC is obtained by paid data collectors under contract and is likely to result in cleaner, 
more accurate data than is routinely provided by using units.  Although SDC seems 
attractive, the presence of SDC personnel in military units is an irritant; SDC also is 
expensive.  Additionally, loading sample data into the OSMIS database is problematic. 
System configuration differences (type, model, series) cause confusion in 
collecting data on warfighting systems, contributing to data errors at the time of field 
entry.  Type, model, series errors can be scrubbed by a PM or contractor personnel, but 
such effort is time-consuming.  An expected corollary benefit of performance-based 
logistics (PBL) is improved database accuracy, which likely would contribute to 
improved analogous cost estimates for successor systems. 
Practitioners who were interviewed either stated directly or implied that cost of 
new technology was not credible without empirical data.  This is similar to the assertion 
in one particular practitioner interview that cost analysts do not consider innovative 
developmental processes or practices to be credible in the absence of empirical cost 
data.  That is, innovative system or component designs or developmental processes are 
seen as risky until the costs are actually demonstrated.  Of course, it might be argued 
that decision-makers should be slow to accept promises without confirmatory data.   
C. Has the DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership 
Costs of its warfighting systems? 
Leadership Pressure to Reduce Total Ownership Cost (TOC)—Program office and 
other DoD personnel indicated during interviews that there is significant emphasis on 
control of cost.  One respondent suggested that the emphasis on cost was most 
=
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 prevalent around a milestone decision point.  Another offered that acquisition milestone 
decision process might be better suited to address ownership cost than the 
JCIDS/JROC process.  Both of these observations are consistent with the mandatory 
independent cost estimates and other cost-related requirements at Milestone B (or 
Program Initiation for Ships in the case of Naval vessels). 
JROC Emphasis on TOC—Three practitioners interviewed who were familiar with 
the JCIDS process and JROC reviews indicated that the JCIDS principal focus was 
interoperability and performance, but none would say that cost was ignored during 
JROC/JCIDS reviews.  This appears to be an opportunity missed because the JCIDS 
and JROC reviews could reinforce the need for user involvement in cost management.  
One obvious approach to emphasize ownership cost would be for the JROC to 
encourage sponsors/users to designate lifecycle cost as a KPP; this is discussed in 
more detail below. 
During pre-acquisition, sponsors or users set out to identify required capabilities 
and include them in the Capability Development Document (CDD).  The most important 
attributes of the new system may be designated Key Performance Parameters (KPP).  
According to persons interviewed, users or sponsors of programs have designated cost 
or sustainment as a KPP for several systems that have recently emerged from pre-
acquisition into system development.  The use of KPP to describe cost or sustainment 
is certainly not a practice that has been adopted universally; nevertheless, that such 
Key Performance Parameters are stated at all suggests that leadership within the user 
community is showing interest in ownership cost and the desire to influence it.   
The observation that cost and sustainment KPP are not used universally may 
reflect users’ long held bias toward warfighting performance, whatever the price.  
However, this observation might also reflect perceived additional risk from bringing 
attention to system lifecycle cost.  It might also suggest that leaders in the user 
community lack confidence in the accuracy of lifecycle cost estimates, particularly as 
related to sustainment costs, which may be accrued far out in the future. 
=
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 Leadership Emphasis on Control of Cost— Senior leaders and practitioners 
interviewed generally agreed that significant pressure is being placed on programs to 
reduce cost.  There was wide agreement that in pre-acquisition and early system 
development, leaders paid more attention to acquisition cost than to O&S cost.  This 
has traditionally been the case and does not seem to have changed appreciably.  
Acquisition cost, such as average unit procurement cost (AUPC) is more immediate and 
can be seen much more clearly than O&S costs that may accrue many years out into 
the future.  There is a sense that O&S costs can be estimated more accurately after 
prototype testing and that prior to that time, O&S simply isn’t accurate enough to 
support decision-making.  The problem with that perception is that it suggests 
acceptance that early tradeoff decisions cannot effectively be influenced by CAIV 
analysis.  
Although during interviews senior-level leaders and other practitioners 
acknowledged uneasiness with trying to target operating and support cost too early in 
development, there may be possible compromise positions.  Practitioners in both Army 
and Navy acquisition thought that emphasis on LCC components should evolve during 
different stages of the developmental process.  For instance, parametric cost analysis 
used during pre-acquisition might be useful for programming, but does not provide 
sufficient granularity to generate detailed cost information with which to influence a 
system’s design or its sustainment plan.  Early tradeoff analysis needs to be supported 
by analogous cost estimates; however, in the absence of complete analogous cost 
estimates, selective O&S cost analysis may be feasible in such areas as system fuel 
and manpower costs. Other contributors to O&S cost, such as subsystem or component 
reliability, might have to be revisited when relevant data becomes available through 
specific component or system testing.  
Interviews that support this research have taken place against a backdrop of 
media reporting on the rapidly escalating costs for warfighting systems.  My perspective 
is that the present environment discourages aggressive analysis and control of O&S 
cost.  Media emphasis seems riveted on acquisition cost, not system lifecycle cost.  A 
program that shifts the discussion to lifecycle invites unpleasant and possibly 
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 undeserved criticism of the lifecycle cost, which always appears unreasonably large, 
contrasted to acquisition cost.  
D. Has the TOC focus been pushed aside by necessity? 
A portion of the acquisition landscape post-9/11 includes expedited actions to 
support military forces engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan.  While this is only a small 
percentage of Defense acquisition, it is very visible and engenders emotional response. 
Sec. 811. Rapid Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies24—This 
law provides relief from applicable law and regulation in such cases where combat 
fatalities have occurred.  Rapid acquisitions under this law are limited to $100,000,000 
and two years.  Whereas this law provides extraordinary relief in support of Armed 
Forces members in combat, there may be very significant associated logistics burdens 
and operating and support costs that result.  This paper in no way argues that rapid 
acquisition is a wrong approach that should not be used.  Rather, this paper 
acknowledges that there is a fresh rationale for avoiding TOC/CAIV consideration.   
During the Cold War, the argument for ignoring TOC was that the United States 
was in a death struggle and that it was necessary to spend the required resources to 
ensure our survival as a nation.  Since 9/11, the earlier argument has resurfaced and 
“morphed” into the necessity for spending money to reduce combat fatalities.  Using the 
armoring of Army and Marine Corps tactical vehicles (HMMWVs and trucks) as an 
example, significant funds have been expended applying armor protection to reduce 
troop fatalities.  Few Americans would argue that up-armoring initiatives should be 
scrapped.  However, at the same time, the DoD should recognize that there are will be 
sizeable logistics support costs due to increased stress on the frame, suspension, tires, 
and power train components of up-armored vehicles.  The apparent lesson for the 
acquisition community is that when it comes to prevention of combat fatalities, questions 
of associated operating and support costs are moot. 
                                            
24 Congress. Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005: Section 811, Rapid 
Acquisition Authority to Respond to Combat Emergencies. PL 108-375, 
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 Other Changes in Focus —Two major acquisition initiatives may increase 
pressure on TOC and possibly compete against CAIV during the “front-end” analysis of 
an emerging warfighting system.   
The first is spiral development, which almost assuredly adds to logistics burden; 
this outcome results from proliferation of type, model, or series of equipment.  The 
second is related to Performance-Based Logistics (PBL).  That is, there is the possibility 
of analysis during the Performance-Based Logistics (PBL) determination—resulting in 
outsourced logistics that are virtually locked-in but are more expensive in some 
scenarios than alternative approaches.  Both spiral development and PBL have 
potential effects on TOC that deserve further study. 
Fact-of-Life Growth in Post Deployment Software Support (PDSS) — 
Although this may not be a change in focus, essential change has gradually shaded the 
picture of system lifecycle cost.  That is, the miracles wrought by software do not come 
without an increase in logistics cost.  PDSS costs are expensive and must be 
anticipated in system lifecycle cost estimates. 
=
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 V. Conclusions and Recommendations   
1. Has the DoD put into place policy and implementing guidance to 
support CAIV considerations during the acquisition of the DoD’s warfighting 
systems? 
OSD and CJCS capstone documents (DoD 5000 series and CJSC 3170 series) 
reflect consideration of affordability, CAIV, and TOC, as described in Section IV of this 
paper.   
DoD 5000 Series, Including the Defense Acquisition Guidebook.  DoDI 
5000.2 mandates the analysis of affordability during pre-acquisition and requires that an 
Affordability Assessment be documented at milestones B and C.  Its guidance on LCC 
ought to be expanded to require lifecycle cost targets at the system level and to 
encourage similar targets at subsystem and component levels.  The Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook provides best practices related to affordability.  The Guidebook’s 
approach is helpful as it examines affordability against a broad background, not in a 
vacuum.  However, the revised guidance needs to extend the affordability analysis to 
show the full effects of expected lifecycle cost, not just modernization cost and 
manpower portions. 
CJCS 3170 Series.  CJCSI 3170.01D and CJCSM 3170.01A guidance allows for 
the possibility of ownership cost being designated a key performance parameter (KPP).  
However, this guidance would be more convincing if it established (as a default option) 
that Key Performance Parameters would be used to address lifecycle cost (LCC) or 
Total Ownership Cost (TOC).  In the absence of such direction, TOC simply enters the 
“trade space” and may be traded off for reduced APUC, greater system capability, or 
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 2. Has the DoD established the processes and tools to monitor and 
control CAIV? 
Since 1999, the various DoD Components have designated Flagship or Pilot 
programs that would lead the way in development of tools, processes, and management 
actions to help control Total Ownership Cost.  However, currently none of the pilot 
programs is in pre-acquisition.  New programs that are in pre-acquisition need to be 
designated as R-TOC Pilots to increase the opportunity for lessons learned on 
application of CAIV. 
Additionally, the DoD Components have OSMIS, AFTOC, and VAMOSC 
databases that, even if imperfect, can nevertheless be used to gain useful insights into 
O&S cost drivers.  The DoD and defense contractors need to continue to refine cost 
databases and develop innovative cost models from which to better understand lifecycle 
cost impacts for legacy and future warfighting systems. 
3. Has DoD leadership exhibited the resolve to control Total Ownership 
Cost of warfighting systems?   
Based only on anecdotal information, this writer is persuaded that the leadership 
backs away from insisting that warfighting programs address affordability.  Lifecycle 
costs are not defined in terms of key performance parameters (KPP).  Emerging 
programs in pre-acquisition are not required to establish lifecycle cost targets to guide 
CAIV analysis.  Current guidance does not focus on total lifecycle affordability, but 
rather on the acquisition cost components and manpower only. 
4. Has the DoD’s Total Ownership Cost focus changed? 
Since 9/11/2001, some of our priorities have changed as conditions in 
contingency areas have changed.  The DoD has used rapid acquisition processes to be 
responsive to warfighters engaged in conflict.  In some cases, total ownership cost has 
diminished in importance, particularly when our military members are being wounded 
and killed.  This bias does not seem to have affected the longer-term developmental 
programs at this juncture.  However, increased O&S bills are already coming due and 
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 must be paid; Supplemental Authorizations notwithstanding, large O&S bills will 
compete with investment accounts for the same scarce resources. 
5. Recommendation for further Study 
Research should be conducted on the influence of spiral development, 
performance-based logistics, and post-deployment software support on lifecycle cost. 
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